Diplomatic History Of India and China Relations
India gained its independence in 1947 and India wanted a new decolonized Asia. Three broad events influenced India’s China policy. In 1949, there was a revolution in China against the Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed, establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led by Mao Tse Tung. The newly established PRC accepted the Leninist-Stalinist style of state administration and CCP immediately removed the buffer of Tibet which acted as a barrier India and China by forcefully annexing Tibet to China. In the early 1950’s, which was an era of decolonization and new countries emerged, India and China was to play an important role. Three broad
- Difference of Opinion:
Nehru’s idea was based on cooperation than containment. Vallabhbhai Patel was keen on a cautious approach. He had sensed that China’s moves needed to be carefully dealt with. He advocated for a military build-up for India and creation of roads near the China border, along with other vital infrastructure. We shouldn’t forget that roads would have played an important role in the 1962 Indo-China war.
Patel also favoured US cooperation to balance China if needed. But his death in 1950 gave Nehru the steering wheel of India’s China policy. Nehru rejected the Veto power given by the UN Security Council and suggested that Veto should be given to China.
India propounded its NAM ideology as an ideology of decolonized world and used this to position itself as a third force in the era of bipolarity. India realized that success and failure of its position in international order depends upon the support and opposition to its efforts from China. In 1950’s, China started to move aggressively in the Tibetan region and tried to expand its infrastructure and incorporate it in the PRC. This heightened India’s concerns. These developments forced India to formulate a China policy. Nehru believed that the India and China led East could guide the world morally when the Western thought process was being guided by polarized ideological underpinnings. This brought Nehru very close to China
- Panchasheel:
During the initial period, India warned China not to undertake aggressive occupation of Tibet and India insisted to follow the British policy to engage diplomatically with Tibet. Again Nehru did not favour the US cooperation to contain China in that region. Later in 1954, India and China came out with an agreement on Tibet. In this agreement, India agreed to recognize Tibet as a part of China and decided not to continue any special rights as inherited from the British in Tibet. This agreement contained the famous Panchasheel.
Important points of Panchasheel are:
- Peaceful coexistence.
- Equality and Mutual Benefit.
- Mutual non-interference.
- Mutual non-aggression.
- Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Reasons for Relations to collapse:
Even though there was an agreement done in 1954, relations began to collapse when the border issues erupted. The Nehruvian dream of creating a new power consisting of India and China started crumbling. India supported China mainly for two reasons- China would restrain from militarizing Tibet and China would support India to write a new chapter in the newly decolonized Asia.
When Stalin succeeded Khrushchev in 1953, he wanted the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) to undertake peace with the West. This became a matter of contention between Khrushchev and Mao and he insinuated Khrushchev that he was misleading the revolutionary movements. This view of Mao affected the Afro-Asian friendship with India. India had great influence in the African region for its aggressive non-violent and non-revolutionary policies. According to Mao, these policies misled the African leaders, who were misled to fight for freedom in non-violent ways instead of revolutions. The 1962 Indo-Sino conflict gave Mao the required impetus to tilt many African leaders towards the revolutionary ideal. Now, India began to perceive that China had embarked upon a divergent and different path of violence and revolution. This closed all the possibilities of cooperation from China and convergence in ideas.
When China started to consolidate its position in Tibet, the US, through CIA, supported Tibetans. This synchronized with the US policy to contain the communist China and the Tibetans gave US enough reasons to send CIA to undertake covertly activities. CIA’s support of arms and equipment to Tibetans convinced Mao that the trio of India-US-USSR was conspiring against China. Mao’s fears increased by India’s policy stance of China not building any military infrastructure in Tibet. In March, 1959, after a massive uprising in Tibet, India extended support to Tibet and was sympathetic towards its cause. India also provided asylum to Dalai Lama and his followers in Dharamshala. This made Mao believe India was responsible for the uprising in Tibet. Even after an agreement between PRC and USSR in 1950 to support each other, USSR declared neutrality in this case. This affirmed Mao’s belief of a possible India-US-USSR- axis to contain China in Tibet.
In 1957, China established a road in Aksai Chin which was vital in transporting equipment’s from PLA to Tibet and in 1960, China told that it would give up claim on Arunachal if India gives up claim on Western Sector, which India rejected.
China also refused to recognize the McMahon line which was drawn by the British as the boundary between India and China. Initially, it was a line which was drawn to demarcate the border between India and Tibet. After November 1961, Nehru began stationing Indian troops in the high altitude region to assert claim. Our troops lacked proper high altitude training and logistics to sustain in that region was not enough. Nehru began a hard-line forward policy with weak military support. Finally, when the Chinese retaliated aggressively in October 1962, they moved deep inside Indian territory up to Brahmaputra plain. The Chinese declared a ceasefire after a month.
After the defeat in the war, there were a lot of changes in public opinion, as they saw it as a betrayal by China, though India extended friendship. Up until Indira Gandhi’s reign, India’s China policy was based only on the premise of resolution of border issues. Post-1962 saw a growth in friendship between India and USSR, China and Pakistan. The Russia-China hostility, which began with Khrushchev and Mao’s conflict, increased, which led to a Treaty between India and Russia in 1971. To contain USSR and India, the US decided to cooperate with China. After the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the US began to undertake reapproachment with China, as India and USSR relations strengthened.
India-China relations again started to improve when ambassador level talks were held in 1976 and Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua visited India and agreed to restart talks on border issues. During 1986-87, Rajiv Gandhi introduced new Indo-Sino policy. He dropped the idea that border talks was a pre-requisite for bi-lateral talks. He eyed on other areas which would create a positive and conducive environment for border talks. The Deng Xiaoping era also had dropped the revolutionary path of Mao and favoured market oriented economy. Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 and launched a Joint Working Group on Border issues.
In 1989, when USSR began to disintegrate, protesters in China challenged CCP rule in China. The CCP resorted to military ways to suppress protests, which led to massacre of mob at the Tiananmen Square. This affected the Sino-American relations. The fall of communism, Berlin Wall and independence of many Soviet States made the survival of CCP very difficult. Therefore China initiated a good neighbourhood policy with India. The Russian Federation which succeeded the USSR refused to play a role in South Asian affairs. As the Gulf War progressed, India faced a crucial financial crisis, which led to good mutual understanding for their own survival. Both the countries agreed to support each other’s causes internationally.
The Vajapayee led government made a new shift in India’s China policy which was based on realism. The Indian Administration wrote to US to clarify India’s need to undertake nuclear test, based on India’s sovereignty. The contents of this information was leaked which contained threat from China’s proximity being a reason for Pokhran-II. This led to the fall in Indo-Sino relations. In 1998, after Pokhran-II, China and US gave a joint statement that India should sign the NPT and become a non-nuclear weapon state and abandon nuclear weapon acquisition. Subsequently, the Talbot and Jaswant Singh talks brought to force the threat India faced from China and convinced US of the threat India genuinely faced from China. The US agreed not to align with the Chinese and support India to become a global player. The Indian diaspora and the Indian economy’s wealth generating potential played an important role in the Indo-US re-approachment. Alarmed by these developments, China realized the potential of Indo-US relations and dropped the ‘punish India’ policy over India’s ‘Chinese threat’ theory. The Chinese gave many concessions in their market for India.
Later in 2005, China and India signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement and Chinese agreed that Sikkim as a part of India. Also, China welcomed India at the regional level by including India in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India became a member of SCO in August 2016. The main reason behind this new conciliatory approach of China was to ensure that India does not become a hedge against the alliance between the US and the China.
Sources:
- International Relations by Pavneet Singh.
- A Brief History of Modern India.
- Basics of International Relations.
Article by Prajwal Koushik